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Abstract—Network Coding-enabled wireless networks are vul-
nerable to data pollution attacks where adversary nodes inject
into the network polluted (i.e. corrupted) packets that prevent
the destination nodes from decoding correctly. Even a small
proportion of pollution can quickly propagate into other packets
via re-coding, occurred at the intermediate nodes, and lead to
resource waste. Therefore, during the past few years, several
solutions have been proposed to provide resistance against data
pollution attacks. One of the most well-known solutions is
Homomorphic Message Authentication Code (HMAC). However,
HMAC is susceptible to a new type of pollution attacks, called tag
pollution attacks, in which a malicious node randomly modifies
MAC tags appended at the end of the transmitted packets.
To address this issue, we have recently proposed an HMAC-
based scheme making use of two types of MAC tags to provide
resistance against both data pollution attacks and tag pollution
attacks. In this paper, we steer our focus on improving the
resistance of our proposed scheme against tag pollution attacks by
decreasing the number of MACs. Finally, we analyze the impact
of the total number of MACs on the bandwidth overhead of the
proposed scheme.
Index Terms—Network coding, homomorphic message authen-
tication code, data pollution attack, tag pollution attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, Network Coding (NC) has emerged as a new
communication paradigm that can provide significant benefits
to networks in terms of bandwidth, robustness to packet losses,
delay and energy consumption [1]–[3]. NC was introduced for
the first time by Ahlswede et al. in [4] and its main principle
is that the intermediate nodes not only store and forward
the incoming packets but also employ coding operations to
mix them. In [5], Li et al. further proposed Linear Network
Coding (LNC) which is based on linear combinations of the
incoming packets at the intermediate nodes. Then, Ho et al.
in [6] proposed Random Linear Network Coding (RLNC) as
a fully distributed method for performing NC. Each node in
RLNC-enabled networks selects a set of coefficients randomly
and uses them to make linear combinations of the incoming
packets.
Due to the mixing and re-coding of packets, RLNC-enabled
networks are vulnerable to a wide range of attacks. More
precisely, RLNC-enabled networks are more susceptible to
pollution attacks than the traditional store-and-forward net-
works. Even a small number of polluted (i.e., modified)
packets can infect a large number of downstream nodes in
the network. If a data pollution attack is not detected by the
intermediate nodes, then the sink nodes will not be able to
recover the original packets correctly. This has as a result
network resources waste.
Therefore, during the past few years, a lot of research effort
has been placed on schemes protecting RLNC-enabled net-
works from pollution attacks. There are three main categories
of these schemes: corrupted packets correction [7], [8], cor-
rupted packets detection [9]–[15], and adversary nodes local-
ization [16], [17]. The corrupted packets correction schemes
can only detect data pollution attacks at the sink side. On
the other hand, the corrupted packets detection schemes make
use of cryptographic schemes, such as homomorphic hash
functions [9], homomorphic signatures [10] and homomorphic
MACs [11]–[13] to enable the intermediate nodes to detect
data pollution attacks. Moreover, the adversary nodes localiza-
tion schemes target detecting the exact location of adversary
nodes and make those nodes unable to propagate polluted
packets [17].
Our research effort is focused on homomorphic MAC-
based schemes since they are low-complexity solutions for
data pollution detection. In these schemes, a MAC or tag is
appended to the end of the transmitted packets, in order to
protect their integrity. However, the homomorphic MAC-based
schemes are susceptible to tag pollution attacks. They are more
sophisticated pollution attacks where an adversary modifies
packet’s tags instead of the packet’s content. Hence, a packet
with polluted tags is possible to travel multiple nodes before
it is detected.
In this sense, we have recently proposed in [18] a new
homomorphic MAC-based scheme, which detects both data
pollution attacks and tag pollution attacks in RLNC-enabled
wireless networks. To protect the integrity of each packet and
corresponding tags (i.e., MACs), the source node generates
multiple MACs for each packet.
In this paper, we intend to improve the resistance of our
proposed scheme against tag pollution attacks by decreasing
the number of MACs. Furthermore, we intend to analyze
the impact of the total number of MACs on the bandwidth
overhead of our proposed scheme in [18].
The rest of the paper is outlined as follows. In Section II, the
background is given. In Section III the impact of the number
of tags on the tag pollution attack probability is presented.
Furthermore, in Section IV the impact of the number of tags on
the bandwidth overhead is given. Finally, Section V concludes
the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
A. RLNC-Enabled Network Model
We consider a RLNC-enabled network model which is
defined by a triple (G,S, I), where G, S, and I represent a
multigraph model of the network, a source node, and non-
source (intermediate and destination) nodes, respectively:
• Directed multigraph G.
Each graph G includes a set of nodes V and a set of
links E. For instance, in Fig 1, the set of nodes is V =
{S, I1, I2, I3, I4, I5, I6, I7}, and the set of links is E =
{e1, ..., e11}.
• Source node S.
There is a source node S who wants to multicast its
messages. Due to RLNC properties, each message is
divided into a sequence of packets in each generation.
Each packet consists of a number of symbols. Only the
packets which belong to the same generation can be
decoded by destination nodes.
• A set of non-source nodes I.
Apart from the source node S which encodes the packets,
we define intermediate and destination nodes in a set of
nodes which recode and decode the packets.
Due to the above mentioned network model, we consider
a traditional multicast scenario where the source S wants to
send its messages to a number of destination nodes(I6, I7)
through several intermediate nodes (I1, ..., I5) (See Fig 1).
More precisely, the source splits each message into a sequence
of packets and partitions them into generations. Our assump-
tion is based on that each generation consists of m packets
u1,u2, ...,um. Each packet ui, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, is represented
by a vector u1, u2, ..., un, where each ui (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is in the
finite field Fp. After that, the source S creates an augmented
packet ui for each packet by prefixing ui with the ith unit
vector of dimension m.
The augmented packet is illustrated in Fig 2 and represented
as a row vector in the finite field Fm+np as follows:
ui = (
m︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, · · · , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
i−1
, 1, 0, · · · , 0, ui,1, · · · , ui,n) ∈ Fm+np (1)
Fig. 1. A simple multicast scenario which includes a source, some interme-
diate, and two destination nodes.
Finally, the source S tries to multicast these augmented
packets to its neighbour nodes. Due to RLNC scheme, an
intermediate node makes random linear combinations of the
incoming packets, buffers them temporarily and creates a new
coded packet y , which is a linear combination of a number
of h augmented packets u1,u2, ...,uh belonging to the same
generation. By using h random coefficients ci ∈ Fp which are
selected by each intermediate node, the new coded packet is
represented as follows:
y =
h∑
i=1
ciui (2)
Upon receiving m linear independent packets, a destination
node can start decoding the original packets using Gaussian
eliminations [6]. The received packets are linear independent
when they belong to the linear subspace spanned by the
original augmented packets. This is represented as follows::
y ∈ (α1u1 + · · ·+ αmum) (3)
Fig. 2. A RLNC model where each message is divided into m packets in
each generation. Each packet includes n symbols of finite field Fp, and a unit
vector of dimension m.
Fig. 3. An overview of our proposed scheme in [18]
where αi ∈ Fp. Otherwise, by transmission errors or
pollution attacks, y is discarded and it is denoted as:
y /∈ (α1u1 + · · ·+ αmum) (4)
B. Key Distribution Model
In our key distribution scheme, a Key Distribution Center
(KDC) assigns two key pools to the source node in order to
generate tags for each packet. Then, KDC assigns a set of
keys from each key pool to each node (i.e. intermediate and
destination) randomly. These keys are used by each node to
verify the integrity of the received packets. According to the
Definition 1, if the key assignment is done appropriately, no
coalition of c nodes can fool another node.
Definition 1. A set system (A,F ), where A is a finite set
of elements and F is an ordered set of subsets of A, is called
a c cover-free family (c-CFF) if, for any community of c sets
x1, ..., xc ∈ F , there is other set z ∈ F , who has
z *
⋃
(x1, ..., xc) (5)
In other words, our key distribution model is based on the
fact that there is not any community including more than c
compromised nodes. The details of our key distribution model
is given in [18].
C. The Proposed Dual-Homomorphic MAC Scheme
In our proposed Dual-HMAC scheme [18], we make use of
two types of tags in order to provide resistance against data
pollution and tag pollution attacks. The first type of tags (i.e.,
MACs) is responsible to check the integrity of the packet,
and the second type of tags (i.e., D-MACs) is responsible to
check the integrity of the MACs. In addition, we use two sets
of secret keys for generating the MACs and the D-MACs.
Our scheme is based on orthogonality properties which have
been presented in [13]. Thus, to calculate the MAC of each
augmented packet, Step 1, in Fig 3, uses the following formula
(formula (3) of [18]):
m+n∑
p=1
ui,pKj,p
Kj,m+n+1
(6)
As a result, we produce l MACs for each augmented packet.
Then, each D-MAC is calculated according to
l∑
p=1
MACi,pK
′
j,p
K ′j,l+1
(7)
In other words, totally L = 2 ∗ l tags are appended to each
augmented packet.
III. THE IMPACT OF THE NUMBER OF D-MACS ON
THE TAG POLLUTION ATTACK PROBABILITY
The proposed scheme provides resistance against data pol-
lution attack which can occur in the intermediate nodes, due to
the l MACs that ensure integrity for the transmitted packets.
However, our scheme can provide partially resistance against
tag pollution attacks, since the l D-MACs are not protected
Fig. 4. The probability of tag pollution in terms of the number of D-MACs,
where c is the number of compromised nodes.
by additional mechanisms ensuring their integrity. In order
to address this issue, in this paper, we focus our work on
analysing how the different number of MACs and D-MACs
appended to each packet can reduce the probability of tag
pollution attack. However, our target is to maintain the same
bandwidth overhead for our scheme compared to the scheme
presented in [13] where only MACs and a signature are used to
provide resistance against tag pollution attacks. For this reason,
in our scheme, the total number of appended tags (i.e., MACs
and D-MACs) to each transmitted packet is calculated by the
following formula which is based on [13], [19]:
L = 2 · e · (c+ 1) · ln q (8)
where:
c : is the number of compromised nodes.
q : is a security parameter.
In other words, the L represents the total number of MACs
and D-MACs appended to each packet. Therefore, the proba-
bility of an attacker to achieve tag pollution in our scheme is
given by the following formula:
Prtag pollution =
Number of D-MAC
L
(9)
According to the formula (9), the probability of tag pollution
decreases as the number of D-MACs decreases and the L is
fixed.
In order to assess the impact of the decreasing number of
D-MACs on the probability of tag pollution, we run a Matlab
simulation for calculating the probability of tag pollution based
on the formulas (8) and (9). Specifically, we run the simulation
for 3 different numbers of compromised nodes ( c = 2, 3 and
4) and q equals to 1000. Fig 4 plots the probability of tag
pollution in terms of the number of D-MACs for c = 2, 3 and
4 .
In Fig 4, the plot shows that the probability of tag pollution
attack decreases as the number of D-MACs decreases. It is
what we expected according to the formula (9) and the fact
that the L has to be fixed. Specifically, we notice in Fig 4
that the maximum value is achieved when the number of D-
MACs is equal to L2 , which is our initial assumption in the
presentation of our proposed scheme in [18].
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Fig. 5. The bandwidth overhead in terms of the number of D-MACs and the
total number of symbols, where c is the number of compromised nodes.
On the other hand, the minimum value of the probability of
tag pollution is placed when the number of D-MACs is equal
to 3, 4, and 5 for c = 2, 3 and 4 respectively.
It is expected since each node has at least one secret key
more than the number of compromised nodes, c, according
to [18]. Our experimental result shows that not only we
still maintain the same bandwidth overhead compared to the
scheme presented in [13], but we also reduce the tag pollution
probability.
IV. THE IMPACT OF THE NUMBER OF D-MACS ON
THE BANDWIDTH OVERHEAD
The bandwidth overhead in terms of the number of the tags
in our proposed scheme can be calculated by the following
formula (10) which is based on [13]:
OverheadBandwidth =
L
m+ n
(10)
where,
L : is the total number of MACs and D-MACs and is given
by the formula (8).
m+ n : is the total number of symbols of each augmented
packet.
According to the formula (10), the bandwidth overhead
is related to the number of D-MACs and the total number
of symbols of the augmented packets. In order to assess
the impact of the number of D-MACs on the bandwidth
overhead, we run a Matlab simulation for calculating the
bandwidth overhead for three different values of the number
of compromised nodes (c = 2, 3, 4). As it is shown in Fig 5,
by decreasing the number of D-MACs and increasing the total
number of symbols, the bandwidth overhead is decreased.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have focused on the improvement of the
Homomorphic MAC-based scheme that we have presented in
our previous work [18] in terms of its resistance against tag
pollution attacks. Our analysis showed that the probability of
tag pollution can be reduced by decreasing the number of
D-MACs appended to the transmitted packets. Finally, our
analysis showed that by decreasing the number of D-MACs
and increasing the total number of symbols, the bandwidth
overhead is decreased.
As future work, we plan to further evaluate and improve
our proposed scheme in order not only to achieve partially tag
pollution attack detection but to be tag pollution immune.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The research leading to these results has received funding
from the European Communitys Seventh Framework Program
[FP7/2007-2013] under grant agreement n 285969 [CODE-
LANCE]. The first author would like to acknowledge support
of the Fundaca˜o para a Cieˆncia e a Tecnologia (FCT -
Portugal), through Grant number: SFRH/BD/102029/2014.
REFERENCES
[1] S. Chachulski, M. Jennings, S. Katti, and D. Katabi, Trading structure
for randomness in wireless opportunistic routing. ACM, 2007, vol. 37,
no. 4.
[2] D. Petrovic´, K. Ramchandran, and J. Rabaey, “Overcoming untuned
radios in wireless networks with network coding,” IEEE/ACM Transac-
tions on Networking (TON), vol. 14, no. SI, pp. 2649–2657, 2006.
[3] C. Gkantsidis and P. R. Rodriguez, “Network coding for large scale
content distribution,” in INFOCOM 2005. 24th Annual Joint Conference
of the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies. Proceedings
IEEE, vol. 4. IEEE, 2005, pp. 2235–2245.
[4] R. Ahlswede, N. Cai, S.-Y. Li, and R. W. Yeung, “Network information
flow,” Information Theory, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 46, no. 4, pp.
1204–1216, 2000.
[5] S.-Y. Li, R. W. Yeung, and N. Cai, “Linear network coding,” Information
Theory, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 49, no. 2, pp. 371–381, 2003.
[6] T. Ho, M. Me´dard, R. Koetter, D. R. Karger, M. Effros, J. Shi, and
B. Leong, “A random linear network coding approach to multicast,”
Information Theory, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 52, no. 10, pp. 4413–
4430, 2006.
[7] T. Ho, B. Leong, R. Koetter, M. Me´dard, M. Effros, and D. R. Karger,
“Byzantine modification detection in multicast networks with random
network coding,” Information Theory, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 54,
no. 6, pp. 2798–2803, 2008.
[8] S. Jaggi, M. Langberg, S. Katti, T. Ho, D. Katabi, and M. Me´dard,
“Resilient network coding in the presence of byzantine adversaries,”
in INFOCOM 2007. 26th IEEE International Conference on Computer
Communications. IEEE. IEEE, 2007, pp. 616–624.
[9] C. Gkantsidis, P. Rodriguez et al., “Cooperative security for network
coding file distribution.” in INFOCOM, vol. 3, 2006, p. 5.
[10] F. Zhao, T. Kalker, M. Me´dard, and K. J. Han, “Signatures for content
distribution with network coding,” in Information Theory, 2007. ISIT
2007. IEEE International Symposium on. IEEE, 2007, pp. 556–560.
[11] S. Agrawal and D. Boneh, “Homomorphic macs: Mac-based integrity
for network coding,” in Applied Cryptography and Network Security.
Springer, 2009, pp. 292–305.
[12] Y. Li, H. Yao, M. Chen, S. Jaggi, and A. Rosen, “Ripple authentication
for network coding,” in INFOCOM, 2010 Proceedings IEEE. IEEE,
2010, pp. 1–9.
[13] P. Zhang, Y. Jiang, C. Lin, H. Yao, A. Wasef, and X. Shen, “Padding for
orthogonality: Efficient subspace authentication for network coding,” in
INFOCOM, 2011 Proceedings IEEE. IEEE, 2011, pp. 1026–1034.
[14] M. N. Krohn, M. J. Freedman, and D. Mazieres, “On-the-fly verification
of rateless erasure codes for efficient content distribution,” in Security
and Privacy, 2004. Proceedings. 2004 IEEE Symposium on. IEEE,
2004, pp. 226–240.
[15] Z. Yu, Y. Wei, B. Ramkumar, and Y. Guan, “An efficient signature-
based scheme for securing network coding against pollution attacks,” in
INFOCOM 2008. The 27th Conference on Computer Communications.
IEEE. IEEE, 2008.
[16] A. Le and A. Markopoulou, “Tesla-based defense against pollution
attacks in p2p systems with network coding,” in Network Coding
(NetCod), 2011 International Symposium on. IEEE, 2011, pp. 1–7.
[17] ——, “Cooperative defense against pollution attacks in network coding
using spacemac,” Selected Areas in Communications, IEEE Journal on,
vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 442–449, 2012.
[18] A. Esfahani, D. Yang, G. Mantas, A. Nascimento, and J. Rodriguez,
“Dual-homomorphic message authentication code scheme for network
coding-enabled wireless sensor networks,” International Journal of
Distributed Sensor Networks, 2015.
[19] R. Canetti, J. Garay, G. Itkis, D. Micciancio, M. Naor, and B. Pinkas,
“Multicast security: A taxonomy and some efficient constructions,”
in INFOCOM’99. Eighteenth Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE
Computer and Communications Societies. Proceedings. IEEE, vol. 2.
IEEE, 1999, pp. 708–716.
